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Shattering the Political or the Question of War in Heidegger’s Letter on
Humanism
Babette Babich (Fordham University)

Jean Beaufret’s question concerning humanism was “politically” framed
on several levels as initially presented to Heidegger.1 Accordingly, Heidegger’s
own response was itself political: invoking both technology and the self-same
question of science that we remain—and to this day—still “too pious” (in
Nietzsche’s words) to be able to frame as a question: the very same question
Heidegger develops in his later lectures delivered to the businessmen of
Germany, including his Question Concerning Technology.2
The preoccupation with thinking technology and thinking science remains
with Heidegger to the end of his life. 3 Even more significant perhaps
(particularly in proximity with Heidegger’s focus on language as the “house of
1

Heidegger however insists “Aber der Hauptsatz des «Existentialismus» hat mit jenem Satz in
«Sein und Zeit» nicht das geringste gemeinsam“ and he demonstrates this in point of fact. See
Heidegger, Über den Humanismus. Brief an J.Beaufret, Paris (Bern: Francke, 1954). Citations for
Heidegger’s “The Letter on Humanism” follow Heidegger, Basic Writings (New York: Harper
& Row, 1977) and the same translation appears in Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998). Note Heidegger’s impatience with this question even in his initial
response to its first formulation.
2

The question concerning science is not resolved here as it is not resolved by the Freiburg and
Bremen lectures, nor in the decade and a half to follow. Later Heidegger will go on to note
science’s exclusive concern with “Seienden” together with the conviction that “die
Wissenschaft allein gebe die objective Wahrheit,“ whereby and to be sure Heidegger’s
contrast with science as „die neue Religion“ is ironic: “Ihr gegenüber scheint ein Versuch, das
Sein zu denken, willkürlich und ‚mystisch’.“ Zollikon Seminars: Protokols—Conversation—Letters
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 18.
3

See for discussions the contributions, including my own, in Patricia Glazebrook, ed.,
Heidegger on Science (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012) as well as Babich,
Denker, and Zaborowski, eds., Heidegger und Nietzsche (Amsterdam: Rodopi Verlag, 2012).
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Being” as on the human as “the shepherd of Being”—rather than as “lord of
beings”—and on thinking through the notions of Nähe and Nachbarschaft), is
Heidegger’s focus on malevolence, das Bösartige, thought in terms of the
entanglements of what heals or saves or redeems [das Heilen] and of what is holy
[Heilig]. Relevantly, Nietzsche himself cannot but set das Böse together with the
good—that is to say, good and evil, Gut und Böse—even in his program to go
beyond both as he writes in his Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the
Future. For Heidegger, good logician that he is, following Parmenides, following
the scholastics: “Every ‘no’ is simply the affirmation of the ‘not.’ [Alles Nein ist nur
die Bejahung des Nicht.] Every affirmation consists in acknowledgment.” (237/355)
In this sense, what is to be thought beyond the wretched dealings of human
beings—“der bloßen Schlechtigkeit des menschlichen Handelns”—is the uncanny
malignancy of viciousness, what Heidegger calls the ‘Grimm,’ a word which, like
grauenvoll and unheimlich, words to be taken in a precisely ontic and literal sense,
reflecting the world as it remained or better said as it was left for Heidegger and
his countrymen in the wake of the destruction of World War II, not only in (but
especially in) Germany, not only for (but especially for) Germans.
Heidegger does not say more than this. The effort to think through this claim
has taken the energies of many scholars before me and Heidegger himself finds
it worth outlining as necessary where evil comes to presence in the holy, as in
healing: “With healing, evil appears all the more in the clearing of Being.”
(237/355)
But beyond the elusive and troubling reflection on good and evil, beyond the
issue of the human and the inhuman, i.e., the hard edges of nihilism, what runs
throughout the Letter on Humanism is Heidegger’s own author’s concern with
what can be called the ‘failure’ of his thinking. This failure is evident in what he
26

describes as “the inevitable misinterpretations” of his work, an attempt to clarify
which Heidegger had been making since Being and Time, where he had already
attempted to guard in advance against misinterpretations, writing that the reader
might take some time thinking about what was asserted—think for example of
the concept of ‘inauthenticity’ but think also of Sein and Da-Sein—prior to
concluding that only the everyday meaning of the term would be what was (or
could have been) intended. And Heidegger has a number of such efforts
throughout his work: in the Introduction to Metaphysics, he addresses Carnap’s
presumptions on logic contra Heidegger’s own talk of “nothing.” In a related
fashion in his letter to Beaufret, Heidegger invokes the terminus Nichtet where,
as we have just noted it above, Heidegger makes the perfectly logical
observation— nego—that “Alles Nein ist nur die Bejahung des Nicht” (ibid.). A
related terminological precision energizes his attempt in his Die Frage nach der
Technik to emphasize that his project isn’t about condemning technology.
Heidegger summarizes this same effort in his later lecture Time and Being.4
Here he reflects that precisely where one would not presume to have instant and
immediate comprehension of a painting by Paul Klee, for instance, illustrating
the by invoking two of the painter’s last paintings, noting their medium in each
case: »Heilige aus einem Fenster« (Aquarell) and »Tod und Feuer« (Tempura auf
Rupfen), and by this means reminding his listeners that Klee’s paintings are the
subject of a very specific and specifically demanding science—art history: die
Kunstwissenschaft—or indeed Georg Trakl’s »Siebengesang des Todes«, about
which engagement with the exigencies of yet another science, comparative
literature—die Literaturwissenschaft—Heidegger himself could testify from his
4

Zeit und Sein is the title of a lecture and following seminar given in 1962, first published in
German (and French) in 1968 in the context of a celebration of Jean Beaufret. L’Endurance de
la Pensée. Pour saluer Jean Beaufret (Paris: Plon, 1968),. 13-71. Cf. Zur Sache des Denkens
(Tübingen, Max Niemyer,1969).
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encounters with Emil Staiger and others, or indeed physics itself, the archscience of all natural sciences, and quantum physics in particular, naming his
friend Werner Heisenberg.
Heidegger’s point with these three examples is that just where one begins
from a point of reticence or reserve with respect to these fields of expertise, one
has no such restraint when it comes to philosophy. There one expects instant
insight and direct applications for life with no further ado.5
As we know, Heidegger responds to Beaufret’s question by articulating the
challenge of understanding Da-Sein as “ek-sisting.” In other words
As ek-sisting, the human sustains Da-sein in that he or she takes the
Da, the lighting of being, into ‘care.’ But Da-sein itself occurs
essentially as thrown. It unfolds essentially in the throw of Being as
the fateful sending. (207/324)
This sentence seems to summarize Heidegger’s Being and Time (at least the scope
of the book as we have it). Yet given the political claim at stake, with respect to
existentialism and the import of Being and Time, Heidegger immediately contends
that we go wrong—he speaks of Verirrung—if we attempt “to explain the
sentence about humanity’s ek-sistent essence as if it were the secularized
transference to human being of a thought that Christian theology expresses
about God (Deus est suum esse [God is His Being])” (ibid.) not just because, as
5

Heidegger, Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper, 1972), p. 1. The
joke in Heidegger’s day might have been that we are all so many Popperians, as it were:
regarding philosophy as merely a matter of ‘problem solving’ (isolating argument claims and
so on) and expecting ready solutions, where the constant between Heidegger’s day and today
is that analytic philosophy insists that it exemplifies such clarity. This is of course untrue as
one can see by reading any issue of Mind or Synthese, taking any article, pretty much at
random. Philosophy too, be it analytic or continental, is a highly technical affair, complete
with insuperably esoteric referents.
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Heidegger insists in Being and Time: “The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence.”
(205/322)6
The point is quintessentially decisive:
“Here everything is reversed. The section in question was held back
because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning [Kehre] and
did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics.” (208/325)
With this, Heidegger raises the question concerning the putative absence of
ethics in his philosophy: “Soon after Being and Time appeared a young friend
asked me, ‘When are you going to write an ethics?’” (231/349) Here Heidegger
argues that already in Sophocles one can find the clearest articulation of an
ethics, a point Heidegger emphasized in his Introduction to Metaphysics. But
Heidegger foregrounds neither Antigone’s ethical venture nor the Rilke-esque
venturesomeness that is the nature of the human condition as such. More
sympathetically (and that also means more embarrassingly), Heidegger offers
Beaufret a fairly self-referential parable7 as he relates a story about intellectual
sightseers in search of Heraclitus/Heidegger, a tale of visitors who found the
man they sought and immediately turned to leave without finding what they
supposed they came to find.
The motif of seek and ye shall find was of lifelong importance for Heidegger,8
but Heidegger’s wit is telling as he implies that the seekers’ ambition was to find
6

Heidegger emphasizes „Mit Bedacht schreibt daher der angeführte Satz in «Sein und Zeit»
(S. 52) das Wort «Wesen» in Anführungszeichen.“
7

It is hard to avoid reading this anecdote autobiographically, as it might have applied to
Heidegger himself, especially the Heidegger who had so thoroughly anatomized the empty
absorptions of curiosity and idle talk Neugier und Gerede.
8

It was no accident that he asked Bernhard Welte to cite this passage to read at his funeral.
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the thinker in a classic thinking pose (cue Rodin) only to be disappointed.
Heidegger’s source for this reading is Aristotle, according to which Heraclitus’
visitors found him warming himself at an oven. In this all-too-human pose,
backed to the fire, his appalled visitors withdrew. But backside to the fire only
meant that Heraclitus was facing them, from which vantage he noticed their
approach (‘seeing the wolf coming,’ as Socrates also put it with respect to his
assailant Thrasymachus) and their turn to depart. Heraclitus calmed their
embarrassment by addressing it directly: “&"'!( )!* +!( &',!#-! -&./% «Götter
wesen auch hier an.» (234/352)9 There are gods even here.
For Heidegger dwelling is possible as an alongside and as a kind of care
which Heidegger renders in Anaximander’s ethical terms. “Ruch,” which, as he
says, we no longer know the meaning of but for which he gives the middle high
German Ruoch and we note that it is translated into English as “reck.”
Anglophone scholars have been charmed to hear Gerard Manley Hopkins’ usage
in his poem God’s Grandeur:
THE WORLD is charged with the grandeur of God.
It will flame out, like shining from shook foil;
It gathers to a greatness, like the ooze of oil
Bernhard Welte, “Seeking and Finding: The Speech at Heidegger0s Burial,” Thomas Sheehan,
trans. in: Sheehan, ed., Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), 73-75.
See in German, Welte, “Die Gottesfrage im Denken Martin Heideggers,” in: Franz Pöggeler,
ed., Innerlichkeit und Erziehung: In memoriam Gustav Siewerth. Zum Gespräch zwischen Pädagogik,
Philosophie und Theologie (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1964), pp. 177-192.
9

De partibus animalium, 645a19-20. Cf. 233. In his own reflections on the Anaximander
fragment, reflections that engage the challenge of translation, Heidegger also takes up a kind
of dwelling, as allowance, as jointure, as the between, as what Heidegger can call “whiling.”
Thus he reflects in that locus: “What is present is that which lingers awhile. The while occurs
essentially as the transitional arrival in departure: the while comes to presence between
approach and withdrawal. Between this twofold absence, the presencing of all that lingers
occurs. In this ‘between’ whatever lingers awhile is joined.” (41)
30

Crushed. Why do men then now not reck his rod?10
For Heidegger this is “the reck corresponding to #"12, order.”11 Taking this
reading to a rendering of ,!. 1*&$' as “der Brauch,” such ethical usage means for
Heidegger: “to hand something over to its own essence and to keep it in hand,
preserving it as something present.”12
Heidegger thus invokes an already extant ethos of a Greek kind which also
serves him as saying that he has no part of an ethics of a Roman variety which is
to say that he does not have a Judeo-Christian ethics whereby saying this means
that we do not (and cannot) recognize Heidegger’s ethics as such.13 Instead
10

Hopkins’ poem as a whole reads:
THE WORLD is charged with the grandeur of God.
It will flame out, like shining from shook foil;
It gathers to a greatness, like the ooze of oil
Crushed. Why do men then now not reck his rod?
Generations have trod, have trod, have trod;
And all is seared with trade; bleared, smeared with toil;
And wears man’s smudge and shares man’s smell: the soil
Is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod.
And for all this, nature is never spent;
There lives the dearest freshness deep down things;
And though the last lights off the black West went
Oh, morning, at the brown brink eastward, springs—
Because the Holy Ghost over the bent
World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings.
(Written ca. 1883 and published in 1918).

11

Heidegger, “Der Spruch des Anaximander,” Holzwege, S. 356.

12

Ibid., p. 363.

13

Many have tried, particularly as inspired by the repeated impetus of the Heidegger scandals
associated with Heidegger and National Socialism, see, for example, some of the contributions
to Karsten Harries and Christoph Jamme, eds., Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art, and Technology
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1994), as well as Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics (London:
Routledge, 1995), Stuart Elden, Speaking Against Number: Heidegger, Language and the Politics of
Calculation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006) and more recently see too the
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Heidegger’s ethical reflections may be traced even more critically in his
Introduction to Metaphysics in his discussion of to deinotaton, techne as providing “the
basic trait of deinon, the violent” (160) and in his paratactic reflection on real
being where commentators discuss Heidegger’s reflection on Sophocles’ lines
370: hypsipolis apolis.14
Here, for me, what is crucial is Heidegger’s terminological reflections. Thus
we read, here citing the German, that the polis is
politisch, d.h. an der Geschichts-stätte, insofern z.B. die Dichter nur,
aber dann wirklich Dichter, indem die Denker nur, aber dann
wirklich Denker, indem die Priester nur, aber dann wirklich
Priester, indem die Herrscher nur, aber dann wirklich Herrscher
sind.15
This collective sind, that is to say, being what poets are, what thinkers are, what
priest are, what rulers are, profiling so many reflections on being, reflects both
creative and actual doing: namely being as such, namely and this is his point
really and actually being that (in the sense of whatsoever) politico-ethical life role
one happens to be talking about in each case. In this sense, what is to be
supposed is that poets are really to be poets, thinkers really thinkers, priests
really priests, and—this is the patently Platonic point in the cadence Heidegger
contributions to Holger Zaborowski and Alfred Denker, eds., Heidegger und der National
Sozialismus. Heidegger Jahrbuch 5 (Freiburg: Alber, 2009).
14

See Jacques Taminiaux, “The Platonic Roots of Heidegger’s Political Thought,” European
Journal of Political Theory, 6/1 (2007): 11-29 for a discussion of Heidegger and Aristotle and
Plato, among more recent readings, as well as for a political discussion, including an overview
of the literature, Tracy Strong’s chapter, “Heidegger and the Space of the Political” in his
Politics Without Vision: Thinking Without a Bannister in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2012), 263-324.
15

Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), 117.
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carefully retraces here—what is supposed is that rulers really be rulers: Quoting
Heidegger’s own reflections on what poets, thinker, priests, rulers are, this real
being is all about action, eminently so, and that is to say as evidenced in what one
actually does.16 Again, this is the same point Plato makes in his Republic. With
such a reference to deeds or doings, we recall that Heidegger writes in his Letter
on Humanism that “the tragedies of Sophocles—provided such a comparison is at
all permissible—preserve the ethos in their sagas more primordially than
Aristotle’s lectures on ‘Ethics’.” (232-233/350) In this way, too, Heidegger
begins to parse Heraclitus 3-.% 4'-*$56 #!"µ6'. “ Man dwells insofar as he is
man, in the nearness of god.” (233/351)
Readers in philosophy as in political theory are here both intrigued and
uneasy. We have politics and ethics and we have Gewalt-tätige Gewalt. And all of
this, especially in this constellation, is politically problematic. Thus all the while
we read the Letter on Humanism with all of Heidegger’s several and literal
invocations of the language of his interlocutor, we find the locus of Heidegger’s
discussion of the uncanny in the lecture course on Hölderlin’s poem, The Ister,
recalling Sophocles and contrasting with Heidegger’s later focus on Heilen and
malignancy. We cannot but come to an encounter at the same time with das
Unheimliche because the occasion for the letter—and every letter, every text,
every tweet, has such an occasioning context—the eventuality of the letter is one
preceded by, because it endured through, and thus and above all because it in fact
followed in the wake of the world and Germany at war. This is thus an issue that
concerns the theme of violence and rage, not only as Homer uses this in The Iliad,
16

“Sind, dies sagt jedoch: als Gewalt-tätige Gewalt brauchen und Hochragende werden im
geschichtlichen Sein als Schaffende, als Täter.“ Ibid. “Be, but this means: as violent men to
use power, to become pre-eminent in the historical being as creators, as men of action.”
Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959),
162.
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the Greek poem sung in praise of war —Sing rage!—Singe den Zorn— and this
same uncanny violence is connected to Rausch. This is a Befindlichkeit that
endures and feeds on itself in ways that exceed either anxiety or boredom.
Heidegger’s focus on the strange, as we remember this predates his reflections
here: “,! #&('4, ,. #&('7'. We translate: das Unheimliche, the uncanny…”17
It is in this context that a senior and by any measure extra-ordinary thinker—
one often called the thinker of the century—writing, on the loser’s side of a
conflict, to a junior scholar who, one can suppose, in the absence of the war
might never have gotten a chance even to speak to Heidegger, much less enjoy a
friendship and a correspondence with him, a correspondence of an almost every
day kind, reflecting on philosophical matters but also the academic gossip
concerning another scholar who wrote his own big book, Being and Nothingness
borrowing not only from Husserl but also Heidegger himself and who opted to
take a small revenge for slights (as we know that Sartre felt insulted) whether
real or simply perceived, with his own claim for Existentialism is a Humanism.
The video documentary of The Ister made in 2004 by the Australian (at the
time of its making) graduate students, David Barison and Daniel Ross,
documents the persistence of war. In the video as we have it we can see its
resistance as we may say, enduring not by way of the videographer’s encounter
17

Heidegger, Hölderlins Hymn “The Ister” §12, 74. And all this situates, instantiates Heidegger’s
claims on his own behalf with regard to the issue of philological correctness, an issue we may
call the question of translation. “Tell me what you think of translation, and I will tell you who
you are.” (The Ister, §12, 65) Remarking that “this translation is initially alien to us, violent, or,
in ‘philological’ terms, ‘wrong’” Heidegger continues here to pose the question of decision
(regarding rightness and wrongness) as the question of standards and exceptions: “who
decides, and how does one decide, concerning the correctness of a translation? We ‘get’ our
knowledge of the meaning of words in a foreign language from a dictionary or ‘wordbook.’
Yet we too readily forget that the information in a dictionary must always be based upon a
preceding interpretation of linguistic contexts from which particular words and word usages
are taken.” The Ister, §12, 74-75.
34

with the voices of famous and not-so-famous names as recorded in video,
Bernard Stiegler, Jean-Luc Nancy, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, but the video as
document, as archeo-mediation, archive-phenomenology. This is the video
footage of landscape and riverscape and this video has a lot of it, some three
hours worth—not quite as epic as Abel Gance’s Un grand amour de Beethoven
(1936) or better said, Eisenstein’s Panzerkreuzer Potemkin (1925), but still. This
preserved remainder of the wreck of war is seen in its focus on a devastated
town that might well have been forgotten—and be sure on this: one can easily
imagine such oblivion, as we should all of us here recall that we (and this should
embarrass us) scarcely paid attention to the “war” at its outset or even as it
transpired in the time of our own lives. I would know as I was in Dubrovnik in
the Spring of 1991, and all we saw—I organized a conference there, like this one,
but on a different topic—in cities and airports and elsewhere along the way,
weapons, machine guns of the kind we have learned to ignore in our ‘virtual’ age
of the spectacle, as of the ecstatic unreal, the integrated (non)reality that we
suppose the result of terrorism, whereby, as Karl Kraus aptly gives us a formula
for this in his quip regarding what he took to be the quack science of
psychiatry—Kraus was the Thomas Szasz of his day—the remedy for terrorism
(as we in New York City have learned from enduring more than a decade of the
9/11 war on terror), effectively effects or engenders the same terror it claims to
prevent.
In New York, in London, in Paris, we pass policemen or National
Guardsmen armed with machine guns on subway platforms or downtown who
do not blink an eye. Nor do we imagine that we ourselves are living in a fascist
regime, not even after the supposed liberties of American freedom have long
been abrogated by Bush, and again signed into law by Obama, as the so-called
35

and very Orwellian, War is Peace, “Patriot” Act. In the same way, American
drones continue the same ‘fight for freedom’ America claims to be fighting in
distant swath of the world, from Africa and the middle east and onward towards
Asia through Pakistan. We ask only if those drones should be able to kill us in
our own home, we assume that we are fair game along with any other target
anywhere else in the world.
Where indeed is questioning in the wake of technology? Do we question? In
the case of the Balkan conflict or conflicts it is even harder to speak: so many
names in this conflict were almost instantly forgotten but the video flashes a
name on a screen—Vukovar. Here we are reminded not only of the insistent
claim that is the question of the Holocaust, named as it often is named as a word
for a one and only tragedy, an exceptional horror. My question here—and I do
not have an answer—asks what happens in the wake of such singularizing
attention? Thus I ask what our focus, what our recognition, leaves out? What of
Novi Sad or all the other names we do not know? What remains to be, what can
be said of “any bombed-out town” to use the American poet Archibald
MacLeish’s words?18
Heidegger seems too sovereign (there is a Schmittian point here that lies on
the surface and is incorrect and a deeper one that might help us here, which I
cannot pursue).19 What is certain in any case is that Heidegger, especially as one
who could have been called as he was, and to say it again, the thinker of the
century, does not say enough. Thus he uses only the human, all-too-human word
of “shame,” which betrays not only his shame but our shame: this confesses the
18

I refer to Archibald MacLeish’s play, J.B.

19

It is again worth referring to Strong, Politics Without Vision, in this case his chapter “Carl
Schmitt and the Exceptional Sovereign” (218-262).
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body in its vulnerability— its frozen “wet fur” as the war poet Randall Jarrell
wrote in 1945.20
Nietzsche mocked Aristotle along with rest of antiquity by pointing to the
philosophic inconvenience presented by the body (“it dares to behave as if it
actually existed”).21 In Nietzsche’s terms: “The lower body is the reason the
human being does not simply mistake himself for a god.” (BGE §141)
Shame” was Heidegger’s enigmatic word, as Jaspers recounts it22 and if this
tells us something it does not tell us enough because it is not the word we want.
The only thing we want to hear from Heidegger is a plain confession: “guilty.”23
Heidegger’s silence, as his Parisian admirer Jacques Lacan quickly noted, is all
too-sovereign: it is the silence of the master.

20

From my mother’s sleep I fell into the State, / And I hunched in its belly till my wet fur
froze. / Six miles from earth, loosed from its dream of life, / I woke to black flak and the
nightmare fighters. / When I died they washed me out of the turret with a hose. — Randall
Jarrell, The Death of the Ball-Turret Gunner
21

To be sure, the ancients never retracted their own condemnation of Heraclitus, the “dark”
philosopher, burying even his sentiments in the same dung in which he was plastered at the
hour of his death. In addition, of course to its origin in Diogenes Laertius, who was the
subject of Nietzsche’s particular expertise, see too , as part of a litany on vainglory, Marcus
Aurelius who mentions Heraclitus in his Meditations, Book 4.
22

I take this up in connection too with Hannah Arendt in Babich, “Jaspers, Heidegger, and
Arendt: On Politics, Science, and Communication,” Existence, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2009): 1-19. Cf.
Babich, “Daniel Mayier-Katin, Stranger from Abroad: Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, Friendship
and Forgiveness (NY: Norton, 2010),” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies, Vol. 29,
Nr. 4 (Summer 2011): 189-191.
23

There has been an extended scholarly debate on this issue, back and forth and again and I
expect that it is not over, as such debates ought to begin again and again. I list some of the
literature, again, in the final chapter of Babich, Word in Blood, Like Flowers and see too, for a
book length discussion, Charles Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (1995)
and for a powerful contemporary discussion, see Holger Zaborowski, “Eine Frage von Irre und
Schuld?” Martin Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt a/M: Fischer, 2010).
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With respect to Heidegger, the constant return of the philosophical question
posed by Schneeburger, Farias, Faye,24 but also Elizabeth Hirsch and Herbert
Marcuse and still more recently on the far left side of the political spectrum,
Bruno Gulli and others, cannot but mean that something in us asks if Heidegger
does (or does not) speak to us on this our own very politicized sense of the
political?25
Language speaks. Thus where Heidegger invokes simplicity, “ The one thing
thinking would like to attain and for the first time tries to articulate in Being and
Time is something simple,” his point seeks to take up the address of being, “the
simple nearness of an unobtrusive prevailing. The nearness occurs essentially as
language itself.” (212/330) But what matters to note here is that where it comes
to language and proximity Heidegger’s reflection on this same language,
nearness, proximity also offers us one of his rare and uncanny insights into
sound (and this is always a matter of presence and relation, space and time). He
writes:
language is not mere speech, insofar as we represent the latter at
best as the unity of phoneme (or written character), melody, rhythm,
and meaning (or sense). We think of the phoneme and written
24

Guido Schneeberger, Nachlese zu Heidegger: Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken (Bern,
1962), Victor Farías, Heidegger and Nazism (Temple University Press, 1989) Emmanuel Faye,
Heidegger, l‘introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie (Paris: Albin Michel, 2005).
25

I discuss these authors along with a range of surrounding literature and sought to give some
account of this debate and its complexities, including its inherent politics, in my own essays, as
I note one such (and there are others) in the note below. See for an insightful discussion that
also speaks to (and beyond) the present theme, Tracy B. Strong, “Martin Heidegger and the
Space of the Political” in Strong, Politics Without Vision: Thinking Without a Bannister in the
Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013) 263-324. Things are of course
only made more problematic, and we will return to this at the conclusion, although it matters
that Heidegger counts silence as a mode of discourse. But see for one discussion, Babich,
“Heidegger’s Silence” in: Charles Scott and Arleen Dallery, eds., Ethics and Danger: Currents in
Continental Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992) 83-106.
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character as a verbal body for language, of melody and rhythm as its
soul, and whatever has to do with meaning as its spirit. (212213/330)
To say that language is the house of being yields anything but a free or
assured grant. Here everything depends upon appropriation, upon assignment
and that means that here as elsewhere our relation to language is fraught:
language eludes us, the word fails.26 “Instead”—and here we return to the
insurrection of the technical, of technique, and given the dominion of technology
today—
language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an
instrument of domination over beings. Beings themselves appear as
actualities in the interaction of cause and effect. We encounter
beings as actualities in a calculative businesslike way, but also
scientifically and by way of philosophy, with explanations and
proofs. (199/316)27
As Heidegger notes in his own lecture course on the Ister (and I think it is
incumbent upon us to extend his parallel to the email and texting, i.e., our
dependency on our cellphones as on the internet and I here include Facebook
and Twitter):

26

See for a discussion and further references, Babich, Words in Blood, Like Flowers, 3-18.

27

And making a point key to the Beiträge Heidegger adds here: “Zu diesen gehört auch die
Versicherung, etwas sei unerklärlich.“ Ibid. For Heidegger in his Brief uber den
‚Humanismus‘““Der Bindung durch die Ethik muß alle Sorge gewidmet sein, wo der in das
Massenwesen ausgelieferte Mensch der Technik nur durch eine der Technik entsprechende
Sammlung und Ordnung seines Planens und Handelns im ganzen noch zu einer verläßlichen
Beständigkeit gebracht werden kann. Wer dürfte diese Notlage übersehen?” 349.
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we need mention only the airplane and the radio in order to see at
once that not only are both machines devices that have arisen in the
context of modern natural science, but that they are also
determining the course of the most recent history of the modern era.
For it is by no means the case that it is simply the same processes
previously introduced and dealt with by means of the rural postman
and the mail coach that are now being accomplished using other
means. Rather, the airplane and the radio are intrinsically, that is, in
terms of their machine essence and in terms of the extensive scope
of their essence, determining the leeway for playing out possibilities
that can be planned and accomplished through human willpower
and for its putting things into effect.28
None of these things are for Heidegger “the same” and he will contend
that what is needed is not a technological remedy.
Heidegger instead asks us to try something else.
This something else, as I argue elsewhere, takes us to the mere mereness of
things in an echo, be it direct or indirect, of Adorno’s nur, only. This is the barest
of indigent things as we also echo Levinas as Celan too emphasizes this point as
it is to be sure Heidegger’s own. This is the closest Heidegger comes to a
program for action in the age of technology, “hier und jetzt und im Geringen.”29

28

Heidegger, The Ister, 44.

29

Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik,” in: Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske,
1978), 37.
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“Only from the truth of being can the essence of the holy be thought”
When Heidegger speaking to the heart of the charge of nihilism argues
that “Only from the truth of being can the essence of the holy be thought” he
suggests that one must hear language beyond logic in a mode that hearkens to
melody, interval, the spirit of the word.
In this sense Heidegger follows Nietzsche’s recollection of the grammarian
Stoic, namely Seneca, who recommends that philosophy is to become
philology, 30 and to recall Heidegger’s Platonico-Aristotelian phrasing of this
injunction, as we traced this through his 1935 lecture course, what follows then
is that one really has to be a philologist or a grammarian. Only from this juncture
can Heidegger pose the following double question, already set in cadence and
framing his question as critical, reflecting to begin with that “Erst aus dem
Wesen des Heiligen” is it possible to think “das Wesen von Gottheit” and adding
that “Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what
the word ‘God’ is to signify...” Or, as he continues, and we remember that
Germans, Allemanic, Badenser, or Suabian, love the word or [Oder]:
should we not first be able to hear and understand all these words
carefully if we are to be permitted as human beings, that is, as eksistent creatures, to experience a relation of God to human beings?
How can the human being at the present stage of world history ask
at all seriously and rigorously whether the god nears or withdraws,
when he has above all neglected to think into the dimension in
which alone that question can be asked? (230/348)

30

Nietzsche, »Homer und die klassische Philologie«, Werke in drei Bänden (München: WBG,
1954), Vol. 3, 154-174.
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Thinking “into the dimension in which alone that question can be asked” is
nothing other than attempting to think the dimension of the holy. This attempt
to think the sacred corresponds to the doubleness Heidegger is always at pains
to trace as this is also the dimension of the question that is Heidegger’s question
of “the truth of being,” a question he always felt compelled to raise as the
question that is forgotten, withdraws, is closed off as “a dimension if the open
region of being is not cleared and in its clearing is near to humans.” (Ibid.) And
it is in this context that he reflects and this is decisive, as this also echoes
throughout his later work: “Perhaps what is distinctive about this world-epoch
consists in the closure of the dimension of the hale [des Heilen]. Perhaps that is
the sole malignancy [Unheil].” (Ibid.)
The Unheil is tied to what is closed off when Heilen is foreclosed. ‘Heilen’ as
Heidegger speaks of it here is not ‘die Sakrale,’ not ‘Heiligkeit,’ but the hale, the
healthy, the whole or unshattered. This distinction matters more than all the
theology in the world when we are speaking, as Heidegger is clearly speaking,
about a particular world-epoch following not only one world war, and of costs
suffered by not only one people. The hale, what is whole is what is fractured,
sundered, shattered by war and its aftermath, an aftermath that would in
Germany’s case continue late into the 20th century; some would say it is with us
even still. And thus it is that Heilen is what is needed.
In “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger later traces a
Hölderlinian figure of tragedy and strife, an insight that for Hölderlin had a
powerful romance about it, even if we steer clear of supposing Hölderlin a
Romantic thinker when he offered the Heraclitean reflection on harmony and
opposition or tension. Reconciliation as Hölderlin muses with respect to lovers’
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and lovers’ disputes, is in the midst of conflict—Versöhnung ist mitten im Streit und
alles Getrennte findet sich wieder.
The backstretched connection where what is at variance with itself agrees
with itself, where danger prevails and unfolds into the same prevalence is the
salvaging, saving power. Everything in these words speaks with the high pathos
of metaphysics and ultimate redemption. Heidegger’s gesture seeks to bring this
backstretched tension of reconciliation to the quotidian, the here and the now—
the same present, here and now, that is also Goethean gold and thus, as the late
Pierre Hadot sought to remind us, it only the present that remains as our only
possibility for happiness, for well-being—Nietzsche would say convalescence—
just where we find ourselves in this same world-epoch.
For Heidegger this is found if it is found at all in words our commentators
have brought to our attention from those thinkers of the ethical who also learned
as much as they did from Heidegger. We say it once again: “in little things.” Im
Geringen. Adorno’s mere and only: nur.31 This Levinasian word—this very little,
this almost nothing—we have to hear repeatedly in order that we might hear it
for the first time, from Critchley and Bernasconi (yet more understatedly) and
from many others, as Heidegger himself traces the Gering through Hölderlin and
Rilke, George and Trakl.
I have been seeking to place the questions of Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism
such that we might again hear these questions (of humanism and inhumanism,
atheism and theism, on the supposed threats of nihilism and irrationalism) as
questions concerning the possibility of whatever ethics may come forth as a way
not merely of thinking but of being. The trouble with all of this remains as
31

I take this up elsewhere with reference to Adorno in particular. See Babich, “Adorno on
Science and Nihilism, Animals, and Jews,” Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental
Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale, Vol. 14, No. 1, (2011): 110-145.
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Heidegger observes, as Nietzsche had observed, nothing other than our
humanism as this stands and falls with us, in just the way that Heidegger a few
years later would both quote and then unquote or correct Heisenberg,
recollecting that so far from what appears to the insurrection of the human,
“man increasingly and everywhere encounters only himself,” such that there is
instead a retreat, a fading of the human from what it once meant in the quadrate
traced between earth and sky, mortal and divine.
To this day, we do not think this thought and to this day our ethics continue
to be absorbed with the question of our own dignity, ineluctably anthropocentric
as this may be connected, for those who wish to consider Heidegger’s earth and
sky, to the analytic reflections and very real or “deep” earth reflections as these
characterize the thinking and the ethico-ecology of an Arne Naess. Yet simply
by affixing a prefix to our ethics, geo- or bio- in place of our traditionally
anthropocentric ethics we have yet to address the problems Heidegger outlines.
Humanism in this respect, like nationalism and subjectivism, is the problem.
In this sense we, ourselves, get in the way of both the problem of being and any
ethical way of dwelling on this earth.
At stake from the start in Heidegger’s response to Beaufret has been the
complicated question of the human, heard with reference to Kantian dignity,
Würde, which, we know that Kant himself took care to set above, beyond, apart
from price. Heidegger’s reflection reminds us that distinguishing value in this
way is inevitably, i.e., still a kind of valuing.32
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There are many who write on this notion and I recommend in particular Jacques
Taminiaux, not less for his own theoretical background in law. See Taminiaux and in English
and with specific reference to Heidegger and Nietzsche: Taminiaux, “On Heidegger’s
Interpretation of the Will To Power As Art,” New Nietzsche Studies, Vol. 3, Nos. 1 and 2
(1999): 1-22, see for a direct discussion: Babich, “On Connivance, Nihilism, and Value,” New
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Heidegger’s insight continues Nietzsche’s mocking invocation of our
dedication to “shopkeeper’s gold”33 as this holds even with the higher gold of the
spirit” the good Christian is still seeking to be well-paid. 34 In Heidegger’s
encapsulation of this quintessentially Nietzschean point,
precisely through the characterization of something as ‘a value’ what
is so valued is robbed of its worth. That is to say, by the assessment
of something as a value what is valued is admitted only as an object
for man’s estimation. But what a thing is in its Being is not
exhausted by its being an object, particularly when objectivity takes
the form of value. Every valuing, even where it values positively, is
a subjectivisizing. It does not let beings: be. Rather, valuing lets
beings: be valid—solely as the objects of its doing. (228/345)
Here in his letter written to a friendly and one-time opponent Heidegger
writes about the nihilating of nothing: “The nihilating in being is the essence of
what I call the nothing. Hence, because it thinks being, thinking thinks the
nothing. In healing being first grants ascent into grace; to raging its compulsion
to malignancy.” (238/357)35

Nietzsche Studies, Vol. 3, Nos. 1 and 2 (1999): 23-52. Robert Sinnerbrink discusses
Taminiaux’s analysis in an aesthetic context in his “Heidegger and Nietzsche on the “End of
Art” in Babich, Denker, and Zaborowski, eds., Heidegger and Nietzsche (Amsterdam: Rodopi,
2012), 417-428.
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Nietzsche’s term is “Krämer-Gold.” Cf. Z III Von alten und neuen Tafeln, §21.
Cf. Nietzsche’s FW, JGB, GM
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This is double-bound path is fraught and there is no other path—this is why Reiner
Schürmann always called it a double bind. It was this resistant remainder that remains to be
thought. For his part, Schürmann, sought to think them without dismissing them as simply
beyond the pale, beyond consideration: to be condemned, the Rylean move, that enshrines the
ad hominem argument that to do this day remains the major issue when it comes to
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Heidegger’s concluding words ask us to pay attention to what would be
needed for reading not words but the letter itself and thus the spirit of German
song, as this last was Hölderlin’s observance. Where literary scholars trace the
strictures of the “feste Buchstab,” 36 I hear this attention to the melos of
“deutscher Gesang” as this sounds at the end of Hölderlin’s Patmos hymn, a
poem that accompanies Heidegger for the rest of his life:
Nah ist
Und schwer zu fassen der Gott.
And we know how that line goes for the poet, as we have learned from
Heidegger to think into the dark forms of the beginning of this poem, named as
it is for an island consecrated to the apostle of the word, and we know the rest of
this line not only from Hölderlin but Heidegger:
Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst
Das Rettende auch.
I hear the end of the poem:
Der feste Buchstab, und Bestehendes gut
Gedeutet. Dem folgt deutscher Gesang.
However one chooses to read the poet’s words, whether it be with the literary
theorist’s attention to the “feste Buchstab” or the philosopher’s hearkening to
song, Heidegger’s ultimate point remains revolutionary.37 Thus I have sought to
Heidegger’s “not a good man.” I take this up, and I recommend the other contributions to the
same collection, in my “Schürmann’s Broken Hegemonies: The Cracks in Heidegger’s
Contributions and Meister Eckhart’s Alchemy.” In: Vishwa Adluri, ed., On Reiner Schürmann
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, forthcoming).
36
I refer here to the contributions to collection edited by Aris Fioretos, The Solid Letter:
Readings of Friendrich Holderlin (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).
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And when I say that I do not merely here his own allusive claim that die “Sprache ist so die
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set Heidegger on the side of the phantasm of civic political action, the fantasy of
revolution that is Occupy Wall Street 38 as what remains for the essential
challenge of philosophy for life, for changing the world, just as Marx reflected.

Concluding Marxian Postscript
At the end of a text, at the end of a talk, as true for us, true for Heidegger,
one begins to read. Thus we recall Heidegger’s references to Marx throughout his
letter, referring to Sartre’s dialogue with Marx, but also to homelessness, making
his reference more pragmatic than academic. One key reference to Marx is
articulated in Heidegger’s typical coopting strategy of reading other thinkers
through their own claims, and summarizing the trajectory we have been
following down to Hölderlin’s lovers’ Versöhnung as Heidegger describes this
very reciprocal return, one to another, in Husserlian Hegelian or indeed
Heideggerian terms:
Absolute metaphysics, with its Marxian and Nietzschean inversions,
belongs to the history of the truth of being. Whatever stems from it
cannot be countered or even cast aside by refutations. It can only be
taken up in such a way that its truth is more primordially sheltered
in being itself and removed from the domain of mere human opinion.
All refutation in the field of essential thinking is foolish. Strife
among thinkers is the “lovers’ quarrel” concerning the matter itself.
It assists them mutually toward a simple belonging to the Same,
Sprache des Seins, wie die Wolken die Wolken des Himmels sind” but and much rather that
das “Denken legt mit seinem Sagen unscheinbare Furchen in die Sprache.”
38
See if you like, my essays: “Politics and Heidegger: Aristotle, Superman, and !i"ek,” Telos,
Vol. 161 (Winter 2012): 141-161 and “Weaker Hermeneutics: Changing Convictions,
Changing the World,” in: Syliva Mazzinie, ed., Hermeneutic Communism (Forthcoming).
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from which they find what is fitting for them in the destiny of being.
(215-216/331-332)
What is needed for Heidegger is an articulation of a philosophical encounter
with Marxism in an age where die “Heimatlosigkeit wird ein Weltschicksal”
(219/336) — where we note just once more, and where the images from Gaza
may bring this home to us and quite literally: whatever else it is, Heidegger’s
letter on humanism is a letter from a war-devastated world.
Everything, and I am not only speaking of bridges and houses, everything is
shattered.
Here “the danger [die Gefahr],” to be thought between »Amerikanismus« and
»Kommunismus«

and

above

all

in

terms

of

“nationalism,”

defined

“metaphysically as an anthropologism and as such as a subjektivism” 39 —
including indeed and even the language of Geschick40 itself — is also in sway as
Heidegger here returns to the notion of science as signifying the “end of
philosophy” and “its utter dissolution in the sciences, the unity of which unfolds
similarly anew in cybernetics“41 The ‘Gefahr’ in this sense is driven, tracked, as
what Heidegger was fond of calling one-track thinking and science, and it is as
dangerous as it is because it cannot be directly countered.
We are back to the little, we are back to almost nothing, to little things, and in
every case we risk a shattering confrontation with our own suppositions, our
39

“Dieser ist die Subjektivität des Menschen in der Totalität. Er vollzieht ihre unbedingte
Selbstbehauptung.”
40

“Die Technik ist in ihrem Wesen ein seinsgeschichtliches Geschick der in der Vergessenheit
ruhenden Wahrheit des Seins.” (337)
41

“Der Rückfall des Denkens in die Metaphysik nimmt eine neue Form an: Es ist das Ende
der Philosophie im Sinne der vollstandigen Auflosung in die Wissenschaften, deren Einheit
sich gleichfalls neu in der Kybernetik entfaltet.“ Erste Auflage, 1949.
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own convictions as Nietzsche would say, our own “prejudices.” Where all that
was solid had been obliterated (twice) Heidegger emphasizes that “to
‘philosophize’ about being shattered is separated by a chasm from a thinking that
is shattered.” (223/340)42

42

To this day we may yet — but only to the extent as Heidegger also argues that we ‘risk’ or
allow this shattering in our own thinking — hear Heidegger’s call for a revolution: “What is
needed in the present world crisis is less philosophy, but more attentiveness in thinking; less
literature, but more cultivation of the letter.”“Nötig ist in der jetzigen Weltnot: weniger
Philosophie, aber mehr Achtsamkeit des Denkens; weniger Literatur, aber mehr Pflege des
Buchstabens.” (360)
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